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1) What has changed in the Chinese labor situation, the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and the international trade union 
movement’s relationship with China? 
 
2) The significance of the Wal-Mart trade union “phenomenon”. 
 
3) What is happening to these Wal-Mart trade-union branches? 
 
4) What can we do as outsiders to help? 
 
 
I. What has changed in the Chinese labor situation? 
 
The answer is a lot has changed in the last 30 years. First is the fact that 30 
years ago, when China had just started dismantling the socialist planned 
economy, it was completely inexperienced when it came to dealing with 
capitalism. In the past quarter century, the Chinese economy has been opened 
up to capitalism. Foreign governments, capitalists, business schools, in fact all 
players in all sectors have established strong relationships with China. They 
have been teaching China how to adopt a so-called competitive market 
economy, how to smash the previous lifetime employment guarantee in 
Chinese factories, and how to exploit unskilled labor. Millions of Chinese state 
workers have had to face massive down-sizing and unemployment in ways not 
dissimilar to what many American workers are experiencing right now in a 
major restructuring of the economy. 
 
In this climate, the ACFTU had to adapt itself to a new economic structure and 
maintain its reason d’etre of being relevant. This began in the early eighties when 
Deng Xiaoping granted the ACFTU a role to argue within the government for 
the protection of workers’ rights, in the hope, already at that time, to maintain 
social stability. The first meaningful thing the ACFTU did in the late 1980s that 
I was aware of, was to fight to include in the Enterprise Law of 1988 the 
inclusion of Staff & Workers’ Representative Congress in state-owned factories 
that has participatory rights at the workplace. Since then in the past twenty 
years the ACFTU has worked to pass a number of pro-worker laws, and has 
succeeded. The latest example is the passage of the Chinese Contract Law last 
year. Getting the new law passed involved a long struggle between the ACFTU 
on the one side and pro-capital Chinese bureaucracies, powerful domestic and 
international capital on the other. But the union leadership carried the day, and 
the new law has re-introduced some job security for the workers though 
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somewhat watered down compared with the first draft. The ACFTU should be 
given some credit for this.  
 
In other respects, the image painted of the ACFTU as a useless trade union is 
generally true. It often acts as if it is no more than a government bureaucracy, 
and in many places across China the local union officials too often side with 
capital and management. The rule of thumb is that the higher the level in the 
national union structure, the better it is. The worst are the local unions in areas 
like Guangdong Province where unions below the city district levels are staffed 
by functionaries who have no idea of trade unionism and are in the pockets of 
foreign investors. But in a minority of cases there are also individuals or some 
trade union branches that have tried to use whatever space they can find to do 
their job in helping workers.  
 
Grassroots labor activism has also changed. Twenty years ago, Han Dongfang 
emerged on Tiananmen Square speaking out for an independent trade union, 
and since the early 1990s has headed China Labor Bulletin in Hong Kong, 
earning the status as the sole representative of Chinese workers. Today, new 
developments have superseded this situation. By the end of the 1990s, dozens 
of home-grown labor NGO groups, equivalent to labor centers in the States, 
have mushroomed inside China. These engage in labor work, raise workers’ 
consciousness, provide legal services to workers, help injured workers seek 
workers’ compensation and represent them in courts, etc. In South China some 
were set up with the support of Hong Kong NGOs; some are registered as 
local Chinese NGOs; some as private businesses, some are not registered, 
operating below the government’s radar screen. Most survive on a shoe-string 
budget, working very closely with workers, taking risks and struggling for the 
cause. They are particularly numerous in the Pearl River Delta. Their 
organizations usually contain a few staff members and some volunteers. They 
have no foreign language skills and can usually only communicate with the 
outside world via the help of Hong Kong labor activists. They have no 
resources to run an English-language website and that is why many of you may 
not know of their existence. But cumulatively in the past fifteen years their 
efforts have borne fruit. Migrant workers’ labor rights awareness in the Pearl 
River Delta region has flourished. In fact, one NGO in Shenzhen was so 
effective in organizing workers that last year a staff member was almost hacked 
to death by gang members sent by local bosses. The point I want to make here 
is that much has changed in the last twenty years. Whereas twenty years ago it 
was necessary to do Chinese labor work in exile, today it is possible to for 
Chinese people to do labor work inside China.  
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In view of these new developments, some American trade unions began to 
review their non-engagement with China and with the ACFTU. Andy Stern had 
the foresight to begin an engagement with the ACFTU several years ago. He 
went about it on two fronts. Since 2002 he had begun making overtures to the 
ACFTU, urging it to target Wal-Mart in synchrony with the unionizing efforts 
in the United States. As Josie Mooney, the emissary of SEIU assigned to the 
task, said in January 2008 at a conference, she made herself into an “idiot 
savant”, seizing every single opportunity she had with the ACFTU to talk about 
the importance of organizing Wal-Mart.1 Although Josie did not take credit for 
the ACFTU’s campaign to organize Wal-Mart, I believe that her several years 
of persistence did have an impact on the ACFTU’s decision in targeting Wal-
Mart. While working from the very top, SEIU has also supported grassroots 
NGO work in Hong Kong and in Shenzhen.  
 
Then last year, of course, there was the Change to Win delegation to China. 
Since you are all familiar with the new developments in the American trade 
union movement, I’ll move on to talk about the Wal-Mart Trade Union 
“phenomenon”. Why it is significant for the ACFTU and what is really 
happening to these Wal-Mart store union branches. 
 
II. The significance of the WMTU “Phenomenon” 
 
The expression “phenomenon” actually came from the Chinese press, which 
reflects its significance in China. In recent years the Chinese government under 
the leadership of Hu Jintao has made a public commitment to building what 
Chinese President Hu Jintao keeps calling a “harmonious society”. One of the 
greatest threats to this so-called “harmonious society” is growing workers’ 
unrest. To achieve the government’s political goals, ambitious targets have been 
set for union expansion into the private sector. In March 2006 central trade 
union authorities in Beijing declared a commitment to set up trade union 
branches in 60 per cent of foreign enterprises in 2006, and 80 per cent in 2007. 
I am sure you are shaking your heads as good trade unionists and saying this is 
not possible. Many thousands upon thousands of workplaces would have to be 
organized within a short period of time.  
 
To initiate this effort, the ACFTU chose Wal-Mart as a principal target. There 
are a number of reasons. Wal-Mart is a huge player in the Chinese economy. 
Wal-Mart also happens to be notorious for its anti-union stance, particularly in 
                                                 
1 Talk presented at the conference, “Imagining International Solidarity: Models for U.S. Labor Solidarity 
for Workers in Latin America and China,” University of Santa Cruz, 2 February 2008.  
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the United States. Setting up unions in Wal-Mart would provide a public 
relations tool for the ACFTU inside China, and improve the ACFTU’s dubious 
international reputation. Perhaps Josie Mooney’s persistence paid off: the 
ACFTU might have thought—why not go after Wal-Mart? Finally, Chinese 
politics since the days of Mao has always liked to use the model-emulation 
method. A successful campaign to unionize a famous company could serve as a 
model for the whole country. 
 
However, the ACFTU soon found out that it was not that easy to crack Wal-
Mart using the old time-honored methods of union branch building–which is 
to collaborate with management and to let management have a say in picking 
the “right” person to be union chair. The chair often is one of the managerial 
staff, or the department head of the human resources section, or a bureaucrat 
sent by the local government. But even then Wal-Mart resisted. Afraid of 
letting a potential Trojan horse through the door, I guess, or afraid of setting an 
international precedent, since Wal-Mart was fighting off unions everywhere else 
in the world. In the city of Nanjing, the local union made 26 visits to the Wal-
Mart store manager, but was not even granted an audience with him. The 
rebuff from Wal-Mart management forced the ACFTU to experiment with a 
new way to set up unions: through mobilizing workers from below. Chinese 
trade union cadres are not trained to set up or run unions in this way – 
particularly not in an antagonistic anti-union environment. But Chinese laws 
actually make it very simple to establish a trade union from below, without 
management’s cooperation. As few as twenty-five workers’ signatures are 
enough to apply to the ACFTU to start a union branch.  
 
The first dozen or so Wal-Mart union branches were all organized using 
“underground” grassroots tactics. The local unions approached workers after 
work hours outside the stores. In Quanzhou, the city trade union which 
successfully organized the first Wal-Mart store trade union actually rented a 
room close to the store to make organizing easier. These efforts culminated in 
secret elections of a union-branch executive committee and union chair. 
Several Wal-Mart store union branches were set up this way at night-time, and 
the next day, the city-level union would announce to Wal-Mart management 
that they had set up a union branch, with the needed 25 signatures. When 
suddenly union branches sprang up one after another in a matter of just two 
weeks, Wal-Mart became alarmed. Realizing what was happening Wal-Mart 
immediately became willing to negotiate with the ACFTU and signed a Five-
point Memorandum in August 2006. This agreement was a compromise. Wal-
Mart would allow union preparatory committees to be set up but with some 
management personnel participation. 
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This unionization method was a big step forward for the ACFTU. 
Unfortunately, though, after the Memorandum was signed the ACFTU no 
longer had to use this time-consuming clandestine method to organize, and it 
reverted to its old ways. Interviews with Wal-Mart store workers indicate that 
before the Memorandum was signed, members of union branches set up 
before that day had experienced the risk of joining a union, had been exposed 
to the idea that management is not union-friendly, and that union executive 
committees and office bearers should be democratically elected and 
accountable to their members. After the Memorandum was signed between 
Wal-Mart and the ACFTU, the process of establishing union branches, from 
above, became vulnerable to Wal-Mart manipulation, possibly with the 
connivance of  pro-management local Party branches and trade unions. 
 
 
III. What is happening to these Wal-Mart trade union branches? 
 
My information comes from several sources: 
 
1) Research by a labor NGO in Shenzhen at 3 Wal-Mart stores—2 of the 3 
were set up before the Memorandum was signed in August 2006. 
 
2) Research by the Beijing Trade Union Cadre Training School—all 3 
stores all set up after the Memorandum was signed.   
 
3) Chinese websites and blogs.  
 
Work conditions at Wal-Mart generally adhere to the law but there are 
violations. All ordinary workers tend to be migrants from other parts of China. 
One attractive feature for the workers is that there is no delayed wage payments 
at Wal-Mart. Wage delays are widespread in this part of China in the 
manufacturing sector. The overwhelming problem facing Wal-Mart employees 
are the low salaries even by Shenzhen’s low standard. In fact, the take-home 
pay is lower than most of the exploited factory production-line workers receive. 
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2006 700 550 79% 400 200 1150 
2007 750 675  90% 400 200 1275 
2008 900 765 85% 400 200 1365 
 
US$1 = 8 yuan 
 
In China each city or even a district of a city sets its own minimum legal wage 
for a 40 hour week. The minimum legal wage is adjusted annually against 
inflation. It is almost a universal practice in this part of China to pay migrant 
wages a so-called “basic wage,” which is exactly equal to the minimum wage. 
But the Buji store in Outer Shenzhen sets the base wage lower than the 
minimum wage, and instead pays the workers a so-called housing subsidy and a 
bonus that add up to 600 yuan. In reality this pay structure is illegal because 
Article 13 of the Shenzhen Regulation on Employee Wages stipulates that workers’ 
base wage must be equal to or more than the legal minimum wage, independent 
of any additional bonuses or subsidies. In Shenzhen there is no way anyone can 
survive on that base wage. The subsidy, which makes up a large component of 
the wage structure, should have been included as normal wage.  
 
Wal-Mart has very good reasons to manipulate the wage package by allocating 
some 40 percent as subsidy. First, since the subsidy is a fringe benefit, there is 
no obligation to increase it each year to catch up with inflation. Wal-Mart does 
not violate the labor law in not adjusting its housing subsidy and bonus. Thus 
when the official minimum wage goes up every year Wal-Mart only adjusts the 
basic wage. This also helps Wal-Mart to avoid paying in full an employer’s 
contribution to its employees’ social security premium, which is calculated as a 
percentage of the worker’s wage. That means Wal-Mart gets away with only 
paying about half the social security premium. 
 
A large percentage of the work force at the Wal-Mart stores is composed of 
casuals or part-timers who receive lower pay and no subsidies. In one of the 
three Shenzhen stores for instance, 440 workers out of 600 employees are 
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casuals and part-timers. Their wages are set a legal level, paid at 7.5 RMB per 
hour. They work an average of four to six hours per day, six days a week. 
They’re rostered to work at busy times, and their work time changes from day 
to day. But as part-timers they do not get the so-called housing subsidies. It is 
only after working as casual or part-time staff for a year, before some of them 
were given the chance to sit for an exam for promotion to full-time status.  
 
One part-time female employee at the Buji store complained that she works 
four hours a day, 30 days a month, but for this she was actually paid only 5.5 
RMB per hour, which amounted to only 500 to 600 RMB take-home pay per 
month, even though she has only one day of rest each month. To make ends 
meet she took up several part-time jobs and found she rarely had any free time. 
 
Of the two Shenzhen Wal-Mart stores that were set up secretly before the 
Memorandum was signed, one of them initially tried to do something for the 
workers. Three months after the union was set up, union activists were still 
trying to convince employees to join, arguing that joining a union could help 
them increase their wages. The union had also succeeded in seeking a 10,000 
yuan injury compensation for two workers. As for the second store’s union, it 
has not done anything. Based on an interview the secretive drive to recruit 
workers had not even been done properly by the district union. Some workers 
had only attended a free dinner in a restaurant organized by the union which 
told them about the advantages of joining the union, and then got signed up by 
someone else as a union member without even knowing it.  
 
The third store, where a union branch was set up about a month after the 
Memorandum was signed, was a disaster. 16 workers there were interviewed, 
and those who said they were union members had no idea who the trade union 
chair was. Management told them that their union chairperson was in the 
Shenzhen Wal-Mart headquarters, and announced that those who wanted to 
join the union should go to one of the managers to sign up. None of them 
knew of any union activities or functions.  
 
All of the three union branches at stores in Beijing that I have information on 
were set up after the Memorandum was signed between Wal-Mart and the 
ACFTU. They were set up by city district level union cadres who did not seem 
to have any conception of trade unionism. They went to the Wal-Mart store 
management, which assigned the human resource management department to 
help set up a trade union preparatory committee. So all in all, these unions did 
not function as unions. 
 
 9
In these 6 union branches, if there were any activities at all they were an outing, 
a sports event, and annual celebrations of festivals, with a distribution of festive 
gifts. Workers do look forward to these small gifts with anticipation, as their 
wages are so low and because state sector workers all got such gifts, sometimes 
in cash at festivals.  
 
None of the workers who were interviewed had any awareness about collective 
bargaining. In Beijing, even the trade union cadre training school staff members 
did not see any urgency to bargain with Wal-Mart. When asked them about this 
last year, they became evasive, indicating that they had to wait for the ACFTU’s 
instructions before they could do anything.    
 
Wal-Mart tries to ensure workers are as little aware of the presence of the union 
as possible. In behalf of the union it is supposed to deduct a small trade union 
fee from the workers’ wage package. Of the three trade unions in Shenzhen we 
did research on, only one union branch deducts 5 yuan from union members’ 
pay packages every month, and this is the union that after having emerged 
secretly initially had continued to recruit members in the hope of strengthening 
itself in preparation to negotiate with management for higher wages. But in the 
other two unions, interviewed workers who claimed they were union members 
expressed surprise at the fact no union fees were deducted or collected. This 
appears to be a deliberate Wal-Mart ploy to downplay the presence of the trade 
union, indeed to expunge the idea of trade unionism from its workers’ minds. 
This explains why interviewed workers sometimes were confused about 
whether there was a union or not, or what it has done or not done.  
 
It can be concluded that except for one Shenzhen store union that had tried to 
act like a union, the other five that we have research field data on are inactive 
or largely under Wal-Mart management control.  
 
Emergence of Real Trade Unionism 
 
Fortunately there is a twist to this pessimistic scenario. A search of Chinese 
websites and web blogs reveals a mixed but encouraging story. The Chinese 
Wal-Mart employees who anonymously contribute blogs write that many of the 
Wal-Mart trade union branches are indeed under the control and manipulation 
of Wal-Mart management and sometimes local Communist Party organs, but 
not all of them. On the internet we have found discussions by Wal-Mart store 
employees about three union branches in which the membership has treated 
their union branches as their own and resisted being controlled by Wal-Mart 
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management or the district unions or Party committees.2 One of these has been 
negotiating with management to remedy labor rights violations and to improve 
the income and work conditions of its members. Based on our web search, we 
cannot tell how many other branches may also be at the service of members, 
except that something good has come out of the Wal-Mart trade union 
phenomenon.  
 
One of the three failed to sustain its independence. It is the Jiali Centre Wal-
Mart trade union branch in Shenzhen, which had a secret union election in 
2006. Based on blog postings, for a while this union was functioning with some 
independence, but the trade union chair had to resign (reasons unknown) and 
Wal-Mart management quickly moved in and replaced him with its own person 
without an election. In October 2007, some workers at this store posted blogs 
calling for help, “It’s over! It’s over! Come and save this Wal-Mart trade 
union!” It is likely that Wal-Mart was able to “re-conquer” the branch with the 
silent consent of the local Party, which had moved into the store to set up a 
Party branch in December 2006.3 
  
A second union branch where members were struggling was the Hujing Store 
branch union in Shenzhen, which was also set up secretly. It was in fact the 
second store in China and the first in Shenzhen City to have a union branch. 
According to the blogs, the members were now trying to get rid of the trade 
union branch chair and the accountant whom they had elected. A few 
employees were in the midst of trying to organize an investigation committee 
and a signature campaign to get rid of the union accountant, despite 
encountering enormous pressure from Wal-Mart management during work 
hours.  An interesting point to note is that, having elected their representatives, 
they were insisting that they be held accountable. The experience of electing 
union cadres of their own choice has arguably created a sense in their minds of 
ownership over the union branch, and a conviction that they have the right to 
dismiss these representatives when they do not live up to the expectations of 
their constituency.  
A far more encouraging case has been the Nanchang Bayi store branch in the 
city of Nanchang, which set up in clandestine fashion in 2006. The chair, Gao 
                                                 
2 “The Emergence of Real Trade Unionism in Wal-Mart Stores,” China Labor News Translations, May 4, 
2008. Available at: http://www.clntranslations.org/article/30/draft. The two authors of this book chapter are 
the editors of China Labor News Translations. 
3 Luohu District Government Website, “Party Branch Begins to Function: workers with party membership 
now have a home” (Chinese) (date unknown). Available at: 
http://www.szlh.gov.cn/main/zfjg/jdbsc/lh/gzdt/41346.shtml# [Accessed 11 August 2008]. 
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Haitao, was elected by popular vote. Since then he has fought against Wal-Mart 
management over one issue after another. It is significant that he had studied 
law on his own while supporting himself by working at Wal-Mart part-time. In 
2005 he passed a nation-wide exam in law but decided to stay on in Wal-Mart 
as a full-timer. His legal knowledge became his main weapon to fight against 
Wal-Mart. 
Over one hundred comments in a web page, from Wal-Mart stores workers all 
over China, have supported him in this struggle, hailing him as a genuine trade 
union leader. Some suggested that he should organize and train the trade union 
chairs in all of the other Wal-Mart stores. Many address him respectfully as 
“Chairman Gao”, though he was not their union chair and was in fact just a 
young rank and file worker in one of the many stores. There were also 
suggestions for collective actions.  
In two instances, Gao fought management against unfair dismissal of 
employees and succeeded. This was seen as so unusual by other workers that 
membership in the branch suddenly jumped from very few members to 500. 
For one of the two cases, Gao lodged an appeal to the district court and won 
the case in August 2008. 
It became a pattern that whatever Wal-Mart management did to combat Gao at 
this branch, the city-level union seconded Wal-Mart. Time and again Gao had 
to seek help from the ACFTU in Beijing to issue instructions to overturn the 
city union’s decisions. Gao openly expressed surprise that different levels in the 
ACFTU structure hold different positions and lamented the stance taken by the 
middle levels of the union.  
The comments made in the blogs bring out clearly that most workers in China 
do not totally dismiss the ACFTU. They can be disappointed and cynical about 
Chinese trade unions, but there is no mention of a desire to set up an 
independent trade union. When given the space to struggle against 
management through existing legal and institutional structures, if competent 
and committed leadership emerges they are willing to rally around it. These 
blogs have become important vehicles for self-expression, exchanges of 
information and ideas, and discussions about collective action.  
Collective Bargaining between the ACFTU and Wal-Mart  
This year for the first time, the ACFTU has suddenly launched a campaign to 
sign collective contracts with Wal-Mart. The first city union to have 
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successfully signed a collective contract was in Shenyang, in China’s North-
Eastern Liaoning Province. According to a news report, the bargaining was 
quite tough. The union presented to management a collective contract draft on 
May of this year. In the beginning management refused to negotiate, and there 
was a stalemate. In June the union’s lawyer sent a letter to management again 
formally requesting “collective consultation”. In early July Wal-Mart conceded 
that it would act in accordance with the law. Then after five rounds of 
“consultation” in mid-July the two parties held a formal collective consultation 
meeting. The highlights of the contract included issues that are most important 
to workers: labor awards, a wage increase, paid leave, social security, workers 
compensation and labor contracts. In the second half of 2008 there is be an 8 
percent or more wage increase compared to 2007. There will be another 8 
percent increase for 2009 based on 2008 wage levels. From now on collective 
consultation will take place in December of each year, and the Wal-Mart basic 
wage will be higher than Shenyang City’s official minimum wage.  A contract 
was then approved by the stores’ Staff and Workers Representative Congress.4 
The campaign was top down. It was preceded by a high-level ceremony 
between one of the ACFTU’s Deputy Chairs and the Wal-Mart Headquarters 
Deputy General Director in June. In that meeting they agreed to a “win-win” 
bargaining situation.5 In Shenzhen, the Buji store trade union was reported to 
have signed a collective contract in behalf of 16 Wal-Mart store unions though 
it is unclear how one store union can sign contracts for other store unions. In 
any case, a 9 percent increase in 2008 and 2009 was stipulated in this contract. 
This falls short of the nation-wide 18 percent wage rise this year for the 
country’s urban population, at a time of substantial inflation. Worse yet, since 
the Buji store is one of the three Wal-Mart stores we have been researching on, 
last week we got inside information that management announced to workers 
their wage increase would begin next year, not this year, which contradicts what 
was stipulated in the contract. Based on our own research on the non-
performance of the Buji store trade union, one can easily imagine that the 
workers had anything to do with the collective contract reported to have been 
passed by the Staff and Workers Representative Congress. 
The biggest disappointment in this collective bargaining campaign was the 
news that on Sept 17 Gao Haitao, the effective, rebellious trade union chair of 
                                                 
4 Yang Haifeng, “Wal-Mart signed a collective contract on wage increase etc.,” Huashang Chenbao 
(Chinese Business Morning News), 15 July 2008. Available at: 
http://nes.liao1.com/newspages?200807/2527492.html [Accessed 11 August 2008]. Also see Tom Mitchell, 
“Wal-Mart in Pay Deals with Chinese Unions,” Financial Times, 24 July 2008. 
5 Xinhua News Agency, “The ACFTU urged Wal-Mart to sign collective contracts,” (Chinese), 26 June 
2008. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com  [Accessed 11 August 2008]. 
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Nanchang Bayi store, handed in his resignation. Unlike other store trade union 
chairs, he took the collective contract seriously, and tried to negotiate a better 
deal for the workers. This time, too, he had no support from the City trade 
union, and the ACFTU in Beijing did not intervene as it had previously. He 
failed in his effort and gave up in frustration. His store’s collective contract was 
then signed by another Wal-Mart store trade union in the same city.  
 
Conclusion 
What can we conclude from this discussion of the Wal-Mart trade union 
branches in China? 
 
First, the ACFTU, for its own reasons, initially achieved a breakthrough, 
organizing trade union branches without consultation with management. But 
having done this initially, it has not continued with it and is allowing the 
program to slide. Why? It is difficult to say. Lack of will? Being told to desist by 
the Communist Party? Or is it that the ACFTU in Beijing lacks the capacity to 
keep a grasp on all the branches all over China, which are under the jurisdiction 
of city trade union offices that come under the control of city governments? Or 
is it partly that local union officials have no idea of trade unionism? Is it partly a 
case of total inexperience in dealing with a seasoned die-hard anti-union 
company like Wal-Mart? Given the lack of transparency in China, we need to 
have access to more information before we can pin-point the most important 
reasons. 
 
There are at least two positive developments—for one based on this study it is 
possible to conclude workplace unions organized secretly even by official local 
unions has given space for some workers to grab the opportunity to turn the 
unions in real unions. In the cases that we have information on, not all secretly 
organized unions could subsequently function as unions, but all unions that 
later struggled against Wal-Mart manage come from the first batch of secretly 
organized unions. In other words, if the ACFTU continued to use this method, 
a new crop of real unions would emerge.   
 
The second positive development is that for the first time ACFTU staff openly 
discussed trade union organizing issues with foreign trade unions and the latter 
might even have had an impact; for instance with SEIU and CAW (Canadian 
Auto Workers Union). 
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Notably, though, it seems that the ACFTU structure is becoming decentralized. 
The chains of command seem to have weakened. For instance, in Guangzhou, 
the trade union chair works closely with Ellen David Friedman (former staff 
member of the National Education Association of Vermont), who is now 
training trade union cadres in China. On the other hand, on the down side, the 
ACFTU finally decided not to intervene in how the Nanchang City trade union 
handled the case of the excellent union branch chair Gao Haitao, leaving him 
in the lurch.  
 
When it comes to the crunch, in collective bargaining, the ACFTU definitely 
did not see to it that good collective contracts were drawn up and implemented. 
Having set up guidelines and a model, the ACFTU has taken a lax position and 
let the different local unions come to deal with Wal-Mart on their own. 
Ordinary workers, who still have no idea about what a collective contract 
means, are left uniformed and uninvolved. In their names, they were supposed 
to have approved the contracts.  
 
But note, as far as we are aware of the ACFTU does not prohibit those workers 
and union branches that want to stand up to Wal-Mart from doing so. So long 
as Chinese law states they can take a particular stance, they are able to, as Gao 
discovered during the past two years. All parties now try to use law to 
legitimize their behavior and pursue their goal. You use the loopholes, but you 
do not openly violate the law. 
 
Overall, the Wal-Mart trade union phenomenon has had some important 
impact on the Chinese labor movement. What initially occurred when Wal-
Mart was secretly organized received widespread publicity throughout China. 
That the ACFTU was able initially to organize democratically elected unions 
and to collectively bargain has been seen as a green light for some workers, 
who can see that they can now legitimately fight for these two rights legally. 
Indeed, in the past year, the Chinese labor movement in foreign-owned 
enterprises in China is on the cusp of entering a new stage. Some workers are 
demanding a right to set up unions through a democratic process. (Shenzhen 
garbage collectors; the Ole Wolff case in Yantai City, Shangdong province)6. 
Some others have fought to recall management-controlled phony unions (the 
Dongguan Nestle case). Some others have tried negotiating for higher pay 
(stories from NGOs), and of course, Gao Haitao tried to negotiate a better 
                                                 
6 “Workers Fight to Save their Union Activists: the Case of Ole Wolff (Yantai) Electronics Ltd,” China 
Labor News Translations, October, 2008, http://www.clntranslations.org/. 
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collective contract. Workers are testing their limits and as they gain more 
experience, these struggles will proliferate. 
 
In this climate what can we outsiders do to help the movement in China? 
Overall, what we can do is quite limited, of course. The Chinese workers 
themselves have to be the ones with the heightened awareness to organize 
themselves to struggle for their rights in ways they think strategically possible. 
But the little we can do can help to quicken the process. You or your trade 
union can either work from the top with the ACFTU, do what Change to Win 
is doing -- trying to pass on experiences of how to set up unions and 
collectively bargain in the face of hostile capital. In China, an understanding 
within the ACFTU about union democracy and about grassroots organizing 
has not yet penetrated very far. This takes time to develop and mature. For 
some 60 years, the only experience the ACFTU has had involved the 
bureaucratic top-down style of setting up union branches.  
 
For those who do not want to have anything to do with the ACFTU, they can 
work from the bottom and support the grassroots labor NGOs and labor 
activists. These are in need moral, financial, and technical support. The NGO 
staff, in my view, needs training in trade unionism and collective bargaining. 
This is because even with good will, they lack a broad enough horizon and 
experience. Finally, for those who choose not to engage in China either from 
the top or from the bottom, maintaining an openly critical stance towards the 
ACFTU can be helpful, when it is not of a hostile Cold War type. Constructive 
criticism from outside China, even when sharp, keeps the ACFTU on its toes 
by keeping the pressure up. 
 
Whichever one of the strategies we use, one thing is clear, we need to keep 
close watch of the labor developments in China and not allow our ideology or 
bias cloud over our objective analyses.   
 
 
 
